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CASE NOTES

CRIMINAL LAW-TAx INVESTIGATIONS-MIRANDA WARNING HELD
INAPPLICABLE To TAX FRAUD INVESTIGATIONS IN ABSENCE OF CUSTODIAL ATMOSPHERE. United States v. Mackiewicz, 401 F.2d 219
(2d Cir.), cert. denied, 89 S. Ct. 253 (1968).
Mackiewicz was suspected of income tax evasion for failure to report,
over a three year period, approximately $84,000 as taxable income. An
agent of the Audit Division of the Internal Revenue Service began an
audit of defendant's account and from records turned over to him
ascertained that Mackiewicz's deposits exceeded his business income.
The case was then referred to a special agent of the Intelligence Division of the Internal Revenue Service. An interview was arranged with
the defendant at his home. The special agent informed him that the
inquiry pertained to certain tax deficiencies and that he did not have
to answer any questions or produce any documents which he felt were
self-incriminating. The special agent, however, failed to inform defendant of his right to counsel. Defendant indicated by a nod that he
understood the warning. Questions were asked from a standard questionnaire designed to enable the agent to fashion a net worth theory.
This was done by comparing defendant's annual increment in asset
value to his reported income. Defendant pleaded ignorance of the
potential import of the agent's questions and a violation of his right
to be informed of his constitutionally guaranteed rights required
by the ruling in Miranda v. Arizona.' The trial court held that a
Miranda warning was inapplicable, absent custodial interrogation, and
that he had voluntarily waived his constitutional rights. HeldAffirmed. Agents are not required to give Miranda warnings to tax-

payers suspected of income tax evasion, notwithstanding the fact that
the case had been referred to a special agent, and that defendant had
voluntarily, unequivocally and intelligently waived his constitutional
rights.

Federal courts have generally held that agents of the Internal Revenue Service have no duty to warn taxpayers of their constitutional
rights under the fifth and sixth amendments. Also, agents need not
advise that the investigation has shifted from the civil to the criminal
2
aspect of the adversary process.
In Gouled v. United States,3 the majority said a special agent of the
Internal Revenue Service, misrepresenting the nature of his visit in
1 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S. Ct. 1602, 16 L. Ed. 2d 694 (1966).

2 United States v. Sclafani, 265 F.2d 408 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 360 U.S. 918 (1959);
Turner v. United States, 222 F.2d 926 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 831 (1955); United
States v. Burdick, 214 F.2d 768 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 831 (1955); Hanson v.
United States, 186 F.2d 61 (8th Cir. 1950); Himmelfarb v. United States, 175 F.2d 924
(9th Cir. 1949).
3 Gouled v. United States, 255 U.S. 298, 41 S. Ct. 261, 65 L. Ed. 647 (1921).
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order to gain access to the suspect's office to seize incriminating papers,
had violated the protections afforded the suspect under the fourth and
fifth amendments of the United States Constitution. Although several
decisions had passed on the tax investigation area previously,4 the
primary case interpreting Gouled is Turner v. United States.5 The
court found that in the absence of a showing of coercion, or affirmative
misrepresentation on the part of the Internal Revenue agents, there
was no violation of the rights secured to the taxpayer by the fourth and
fifth amendments. The court also said that it is not essential in tax
fraud investigations that the suspect be warned that his statements
might be used against him in later criminal proceedings.
The majority of cases apply the same interpretation of the Turner
rationale." A minority of cases construed the "affirmative misrepresentation" test of Turner to be something less than "affirmative misrepresentation."7 United States v. Sclafani8 reaffirmed the Turner doctrine,
holding that the taxpayer was deemed to be informed of his rights by
the warning inherent in the agent's request to see the taxpayer's books.
It expressly disapproved the minority line of cases.0
In the landmark case of Escobedo v. Illinois,10 the United States
Supreme Court enunciated a theory pertaining to the rights of an
accused which marked a culmination of past decisions and evidenced a

new approach in the area of criminal law." Characterizing this new
approach Justice Goldberg speaking for the court stated:
4 United States v. Burdick, 214 F.2d 768 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 831 (1955);
Hanson v. United States, 186 F.2d 61 (8th Cir. 1950); Himmelfarb v. United States, 175
F.2d 924 (9th Cir. 1949).
5 Turner v. United States, 222 F.2d 926 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 831 (1955).
6 Cases cited supra note 4.
7 Matter of Bodkin, 165 F. Supp. 25 (D.C.N.Y. 1958): taxpayer and his accountant were
kept unaware of special agent's entry into case because special agent employed a revenue
agent to gather all incriminating evidence before announcing his presence to taxpayer;
United States v. Wheeler, 149 F. Supp. 445 (D.C. Pa. 1957): special agent's assignment to
inspect records of taxpayer had dual purpose of determining if there was any civil
liability and if there was any criminal liability involving personnel of Internal Revenue
Service; agent misrepresented the purpose of his inquiry to the taxpayer and in so doing
gathered incriminating evidence for tax evasion; United States v. Lipshitz, 132 F. Supp.
519 (D.C.N.Y. 1955): special agent's assignment of a revenue agent to gather incriminating
evidence without defendant's knowledge or consent . . . could not be distinguished from
obtainment thereof by stealth or subterfuge; United States v. Guerrina, 112 F. Supp. 126
(D.C. Pa. 1953): revenue agent failed to inform taxpayer that the true purpose of his
inspection of the books was to procure evidence of fraud for contemplated criminal proceedings and not merely a routine audit.
8 United States v. Sclafani, 265 F.2d 408 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 360 U.S. 918 (1959).
Old. at 414.
10 Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478, 84 S. Ct. 1758, 12 L. Ed. 2d 977 (1964).
11 See generally, Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 53 S. Ct. 55, 77 L. Ed. 158 (1932),
right to counsel at least in capital cases is fundamental to due process of Fourteenth
Amendment; Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 58 S. Ct. 1019, 82 L. Ed. 1461 (1938), Sixth
Amendment guarantee of right of counsel must be competently and intelligently waived;
Hamilton v. Alabama, 368 U.S. 52, 82 S. Ct. 157, 7 L. Ed. 2d 114, absence of counsel for
defendant at time of arraignment violated his rights under due process clause of Fourteenth Amendment; White v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 59, 83 S. Ct. 1050, 10 L. Ed. 2d 193
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[N]o system of criminal justice can, or should survive, if it comes
to depend for its continued effectiveness on the citizens' abdication
through unawareness of their constitutional rights. No system
worth preserving should have to fear that if an accused is permitted
to consult with a lawyer, he will become aware of, and exercise,
these rights. If the exercise of constitutional rights will thwart the
effectiveness of a system of law enforcement,
then there is some12
thing very wrong with that system.
In the area of tax fraud investigation, the effect of the emerging
investigatory-accusatory doctrine of Escobedo was limited by Kohatsu
v. United States.13 The Escobedo rule was held not applicable to tax
investigations because the revenue agent's function was purely investigatory and not accusatory. 14 The rationale in subsequent cases held that
the duty of the special agent was to determine only whether a violation
of tax laws had or had not occurred and was therefore purely investigatory and not accusatory.' 5 Kohatsu was followed generally' yet the
United States Supreme Court has consistently refused to pass upon the
7
issues involved in this area.'
In 1966, the Supreme Court's ruling in the landmark case of
Miranda v. Arizona'8 announced that: "The protections of the fifth
amendment are available outside of criminal court proceedings, and
serve to protect persons in all settings in which their freedom of action
is curtailed in any significant way from being compelled to incriminate
themselves."' 19 The Miranda rule resulted in a split of authority in tax
fraud investigation cases. A minority of post-Miranda decisions applied
Miranda in its liberal sense to tax fraud investigation cases.20 The
(1963), absence of counsel for petitioner when he enters plea of guilty before magistrate
violated his rights under due process clause of Fourteenth Amendment; Massiah v. United
States, 377 U.S. 201, 84 S. Ct. 1199, 12 L. Ed. 2d 246 (1964), Sixth Amendment guarantees
aid of counsel to defendant under interrogation in completely extrajudicial proceedings
(concurring opinion of Justice Stewart).
12 Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478, 490, 84 S. Ct. 1758, 1764, 12 L. Ed. 2d 977, 985
(1964).
13 Kohatsu v. United States, 351 F.2d 898 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 1011 (1966).
14 Id. at 903.

Id. at 902.
16accord, United States v. Maius, 378 F.2d 716 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 905
(1967); Selinger v. Bigler, 377 F.2d 542 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 904, rehearing
denied, 389 U.S. 998 (1967); Rickey v. United States, 360 F.2d 32 (9th Cir.), per curiam,
cert. denied, 385 U.S. 835 (1966).
17 Cases cited supra note 16.
18 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S. Ct. 1602, 16 L. Ed. 2d 694 (1966).
19 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 467, 86 S. Ct. 1602, 1624, 16 L. Ed. 2d 694, 719
(1966).
20 See United States v. Dickerson, 291 F. Supp. 633 (D.C.N.D. Ill. 1968); United States
v. Wainwright, 284 F. Supp. 129 (D.C. Colo. 1968); United States v. Gower, 271 F. Supp.
655 (M.D. Pa. 1967); United States v. Turzynski, 268 F. Supp. 847 (N.D. 111. 1967); United
States v. Harrison, 265 F. Supp, 660 (S.D.N.Y. 1967); United States v. Kingry, 19 AFTR2d
762 (N.D. Fla. 1967); United States v. Schoenberg, 19 AFTR2d 348 (D.C. Ariz. 1966);
recent, United States v. Mathis, 391 U.S. 1, 88 S.Ct. 1503, 20 L. Ed. 2d 381 (1968), holding
that Miranda rule applies to tax investigation cases.
15
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majority of decisions chose not to extend the Escobedo and Miranda
2
rationales into the field of tax investigation. '
The "focus-purpose ' ' 22 theory found in Escobedo was limited by
Kohatsu, and gained support in subsequent cases.23 Miranda held that
fifth amendment protections were available to a person whose freedom
had been curtailed in any significant manner.2 4 This holding had little
effect on subsequent tax fraud investigations. These post-Miranda cases
held that the ruling applied only to custodial interrogations, 25 and that
a brief warning by the agent at the beginning of the investigation was
sufficient to inform the taxpayer of his rights because of his continued
freedom of movement during the investigation.2 6 Thus, it was inferred
that an agent's failure to warn the suspected taxpayer of his constitutional rights before incriminating evidence had been elicited from his
records did not violate either the Escobedo or Miranda rulings.27 Other
cases held that the evidence elicited from the taxpayer during noncustodial Internal Revenue conferences was not subject to a motion to
suppress because of the special agent's failure to advise the taxpayer of
his constitutional rights. This was held even though the failure to give
a warning violated an administrative ruling.28 Another case held that a
taxpayer had to watch out for himself to some extent, and was not
entitled to a formal Miranda warning because it would be an unprece29
dented burden on an administrative task.
21 See Frohmann v. United States, 380 F.2d 832 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 976
(1967); Schlinsky v. United States, 379 F.2d 735 (lst Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 920
(1967); Morgan v. United States, 377 F.2d 507 (1st Cir. 1967); recent, Muse v. United
States, 405 F.2d 40 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, - U.S. - (1969); United States v. Beal, 404
F.2d 58 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, - U.S. - (1969); United States v. Squeri, 398 F.2d 785
(2d Cir. 1968); United States v. Neves, 269 F. Supp. 158 (S.D.N.Y. 1967); United States
v. Bachman, 267 F. Supp. 593 (W.D. Pa. 1966); United States v. Spinney, 264 F. Supp. 774
(D. Mass.), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 921 (1968); Stern v. Robinson, 262 F. Supp. 13 (W.D.
Tenn.), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 1027 (1968); United States v. Hill, 260 F. Supp. 139 (S.D.
Cal. 1966); United States v. Carlson, 260 F. Supp. 423 (E.D.N.Y. 1966); United States v.
Fiore, 258 F. Supp. 435 (W.D. Pa. 1966); United States v. White, 293 F. Supp. 692 (E.D.
Pa. 1968).
22 Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478, 490, 84 S.Ct. 1758, 12 L. Ed. 2d 977 (1964), when
the investigation is no longer a general inquiry, but has focused on a particular individual with the purpose of eliciting a confession from him, then the accusatory stage
has been reached so as to entitle individual to his constitutional rights under the Fifth
and Sixth Amendments.
23 Cases cited supra note 17.
24 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L. Ed. 2d 694 (1966).
25 United States v. Fiore, 258 F. Supp. 435 (W.D. Pa. 1966).
26 United States v. Carlson, 260 F. Supp. 423 (E.D.N.Y. 1966).
27 United States v. Schlinsky, 261 F. Supp. 265 (D. Mass. 1966).
28 United States v. Jaskiewicz, 278 F. Supp. 525 (D.C.E.D. Pa. 1966); Internal Revenue
Service News Release, No. 897, October 3, 1967:
On initial contact with a taxpayer, IRS Special Agents are instructed to produce
their credentials and state: "As a special agent, I have the function of investigating
the possibility of criminal tax fraud." If the potential criminal aspects of the matter
are not resolved by preliminary inquiries and further investigation becomes necessary, the Special Agent is required to advise the taxpayer of his Constitutional rights
to remain silent and to retain counsel.
29 Morgan v. United States, 377 F.2d 507 (Ist Cir. 1967).
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A minority of post-Miranda cases applied the Miranda warning to
Internal Revenue practices of questioning suspected taxpayers. The
rationale of these cases involves the boundary between the investigatory-accusatory stage and the entry of the special agent into the tax
fraud investigation.-3 The first case on this question, United States
v. Kingry,3 1 held the Miranda warning applicable to non-custodial
criminal investigations. An appraisal of constitutional rights is required
when a tax investigation, without the taxpayer's knowledge, shifts from
the civil to the criminal stage of the adversary process. 3 2 At this stage,

the taxpayer is in need of the advice of counsel and should be warned
of his rights the moment the investigation becomes criminally oriented.3 3 Another case held the Miranda warning applicable to trials
begun after the date of the decision, hence requiring the Internal
Revenue agents to inform the suspected taxpayer of his constitutional
rights immediately after the criminal investigation is launched.3 4 In
Mathis v. United States3 5 the Mirandawarning was held to be required
when a revenue agent questioned an already in-custody suspect in relation to the suspect's fraudulently filed tax returns.
The court in the instant case held the Miranda warning inapplicable
for several reasons. It first reasoned that the defendant had "unequivocally, specifically, and intelligently" waived his constitutional rights. 3 6

The court reasoned that the defendant's nodding his head in response
to the brief warning, coupled with his subsequent cooperation, was
sufficient indication that he was aware of his rights and had waived
them.3 7 The majority of the court stated that the transfer of the case
from the Audit Division to the Intelligence Division was not the decisive factor in establishing a custodial interrogation requiring a Miranda
warning to be given.38 They reasoned that in some instances administrative investigators might have to infringe upon private citizens' constitutional rights, but the infringement in this case did not warrant a
"full-blown" Miranda warning. 39 To require a formal warning at
this stage of the proceedings would clutter an already difficult
administrative task. 40 The court also felt that it would be an administrative impossibility to warn the taxpayer every time an agent's suspicions based on changing evaluations of the evidence shifted. 41 The
3

OCases cited supra note 21.
31 United States v. Kingry, 19 AFTR2d 762 (N.D. Fla. 1967).
52 United States v. Turzynski, 268 F. Supp. 847 (N.D. Ill. 1967).
33 United States v. Cower, 271 F. Supp. 655 (M.D. Pa. 1967).
34 United States v. Dickerson, 291 F. Supp. 633 (D.C.N.D. II1. 1968).
35 Mathis v. United States, 391 U.S. 1, 88 S. Ct. 1503, 20 L. Ed. 2d 381 (1968).
36 United States v. Mackiewicz, 401 F.2d 219 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 89 S. Ct. 253 (1968).
37 Id. at 221, 223.
38 Id. at 221, 222.
39 Id. at 222.
40 Id.

41Id.
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court held that the investigation was not charged with an atmosphere
tantamount to an actual custodial interrogation. 42 They based theil
reasoning on the interview's total perspective, not on a technical custody requirement. 48 Thus, the court found an absence of a coercive
atmosphere because the interview was conducted at the defendant's
44
home where he was free to come and go, or ask the agents to leave.
The majority then stated that the agent's failure to explain the potential import of the questions was not intentionally misleading. 45 They
reasoned that to require a Miranda warning based on the taxpayer's
unawareness of the Internal Revenue's procedures would result in a
rule "too illusory to form a rational and practical basis for administrative action." 46 The court therefore held that evidence voluntarily given
47
should not be subject to exclusion, absent coercive factors.
The concurring opinion agreed with the majority's application of
Miranda.There was, however, a statement by the concurring judge that
the analysis of Miranda may have been misapplied.48 It was also his
opinion that a requirement of a warning at the moment the case was
referred to a special agent would not cause serious administrative
49
difficulties.
The non-extension policy enunciated in United States v. Mackiewicz
bolsters the majority of federal court decisions holding Miranda inapplicable in absence of a custodial atmosphere. 50 This custodial test
is supported by a prior United States Supreme Court decision in Mathis
v. United States.51 The facts are distinguishable because the petitioner
was in custody when the agent made his interrogation. It seems this case
will be limited to its peculiar fact situation and will not control the
usual tax fraud investigation. Placing such a limitation on the theory
behind Miranda has the effect of limiting the application of the Escobedo rule. It also overlooks the nature of the tax investigation itself, 52 and denies to the suspected taxpayer his constitutional rights

53
at a point when they are critically needed.
The view in Mackiewicz is supported by a majority of federal court
decisions, however the United States Supreme Court has not yet decided
the precise issue of a pre-custodial Mirandawarning in tax investigation
42 Id.

43 Id.
44 Id. at 222, 223.
45Id. at 223.
46 Id.
47 Id.
48

Id. at 226.

49 Id.

Cases cited supra note 21.
51 Mathis v. United States, 391 U.S. 1, 88 S. Ct. 1503, 20 L. Ed. 2d 381 (1968).
52 Hewitt, The Constitutional Rights of the Taxpayer in a Fraud Investigation, 44
Taxes 660, 690.
50

53 Id.
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cases. 54 The Supreme Court's decision in Mathis v. United States is not
determinative of this issue. The facts of that case were such as to denote
an obvious situation in which Miranda clearly applied. Mathis would
therefore be confined to the principle that the Miranda requirements
are not limited to the questioning of one who is in custody in connection with the very case under investigation.5 5
The court appeared to rely heavily on the theory that a Miranda
warning would further burden an administrative task and hinder the
collection of taxes. A recent Internal Revenue news release would
indicate that the Service holds a contrary opinion. 5 A previous case
held, however, that there was no violation of Miranda where the agent
failed to give a taxpayer a Miranda warning, although such failure
violated an administrative ruling.5 7 Such a contention is dubious, as
evidenced by the language of the concurring opinion in Mackiewicz.5 8
A more realistic approach would be that revenue agents could no longer
depend on the suspected taxpayer to be his own executioner. 59 More
diligent investigatory procedures would then be required of revenue
agents in obtaining incriminating evidence from the suspected taxpayer. 60 The result would therefore more fully conform with the
Miranda rationale of giving "meaningful protection to fifth amendment rights." 61
The argument of an over-burdened administrative task is without
merit. A warning would better serve the ends of justice by informing
the suspect taxpayer of his perilous situation and of the constitutional
rights available to him. To hold otherwise would promote a class distinction in the field of criminal law 62 by recognizing government
expediency to be paramount to an individual's constitutionally guaranteed rights. The potential consequences of an adverse tax investigation
are such as to warrant a Miranda warning the moment the investigation
assumes the status of a criminal investigation. It is at this point that the
defendant becomes an accused, and no distinction should be made
between a criminal tax investigation and any other criminal investiga54 Muse v. United States, 405 F.2d 40 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, - U.S. - (1969); United
States v. Beal, 404 F.2d 58 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, - U.S. - (1969); see also, cases cited
supra note 17.
55 Mathis v. United States, 391 U.S. 1, 88 S. Ct. 1503, 20 L. Ed. 2d 381 (1968).
56 Internal Revenue Service news release, No. 949, November 26, 1968.
57 United States v. Jaskiewicz, 278 F. Supp. 525 (D.C.E.D. Pa. 1966).
58 United States v. Mackiewicz, 401 F.2d 219, 226 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 89 S. Ct. 255
(1968).
59 See note 52 supra, at 689.
60 ld.
61 Mathis v. United States, 391 U.S. 1, 88 S. Ct. 1503, 1505, 20 L. Ed. 2d 381 (1968).
62 See Andrews, The Right to Counsel in Criminal Tax Investigations Under Escobedo
and Miranda: "The Critical Stage," 76 Iowa L. Rev. 1074.
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